

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-14

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SANTIAGO 1120

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E. O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: AMGT, PEPR, XM, CI  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: SUMMARY IMPLEMENTATION  
PLAN

REF: STATE 34007

1. USG INTERESTS IN CHILE ARE OVERWHELMINGLY DOMINATED BY HUMAN RIGHTS CONOERNS. WHILE OUR CURRENT LIST OF POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES (STATE 34007) COTAINS THE USUAL REFERENCES TO U.S. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION, ETC., THE FACT IS THAT HUMAN RIGHTS GOALS ABSORB MOST OF THE EMBASSY'S ENERGIES/ RESOURCES AND ARE PURSUED REGARDLESS OF THE IMPACT UPON OTHER POLICY GOALS. HUMAN RIGHTS GOALS ARE THE AGREED AND ESTABLISHED CENTERPIECE OF U.S. POLICY.

2. THIS AGREEMENT ON POLICY IS MATCHED BY SERIOUS DEBATE ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS. IT IS PRECISELY THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN "IMPLEMENTATION PLAN" WHICH SURFACES THE CRITICAL CHOICES FOR U.S. POLICY. IN PURSUING HUMAN RIGHTS GOALS I (ELIMINATION OF GROSS VIOLATIONS), II (CHANGE INSTITUTIONS TO INSURE RULE OF LAW), III (RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY), AND V (ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS), WHAT APPROACH, WHAT COMBINATIONS OF ACTIONS WILL BE MOST SUCCESSFUL? THERE ARE THREE BASIC OPTIONS:

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A. WORK THROUGH THE REGIME OPTION.

1) THIS APPROACH IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PINOCHET WILL REMAIN IN OFFICE AND THTAT THE MILITARY WILL HOLD THE POWER BALANCE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. PINOCHET'S STRENGTH WAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED BY THE JANUARY 4 PLEBISCITE. CHILE'S TRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVE SEGMENTS AND THOSE WHO PREFER THE STATUS QUO BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR OF A RETURN TO THE CHAOS

OF ALLENDE-LIKE POLITICS INSURED A MAJORITY FOR HIM. THIS MAJORITY WAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED BY THE EMOTIONAL NATIONALISM STIRRED UP THE CRITICAL TONE OF THE 1977 UN RESOLUTION. THE SIZE OF PINOCHET'S VICTORY ENHANCED HIS POSITION VIS-A-VIS OTHER JUNTA MEMBERS. IT ALSO DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY THAT THERE IS NO MASSIVE MOVEMENT IN CHILE POISED TO OVERTHROW PINOCHET AT THIS TIME. MOREOVER, THE CHILEAN ECONOMY HAS SHOWN STRONG RECOVERY, PARTICULARLY IN CURBING INFLATION AND REGAINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING COMMUNITY. PROBLEMS REMAIN, AMONG THEM LOW INVESTMENT AND DOMESTIC SOCIAL COSTS, BUT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT FALL BECAUSE OF THEM NOW.

2) OUR GOALS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY CONVINCING/  
PRESSURING THE GOC ITSELF TO DO WHAT WE WANT DONE. HOW? WHAT MODULATED COMBINATION OF CRITICISM/PUNISHMENT AND ENCOURAGEMENT/REWARD WILL ACHIEVE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY GOALS? MY JUDGMENT IS THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THERE IS NO SUCH COMBINATION. IN RESPONSE TO VARIOUS THREATS AND SANCTIONS, THE GOC IMPROVED SOME BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS (THE VAST MAJORITY OF POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED, SHARPLY LOWER INCIDENCES OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION, TORTURE, AND DISAPPEARANCES). THE US HAS TERMINATED ECONOMIC AID AS WELL AS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES; A PATTERN OF USG VOTES TO DISAPPROVE IFI LOANS IS ALREADY ESTABLISHED AND, IN ANY CASE, CHILE IS OBTAINING PRIVATE BANK FINANCING ON A SCALE THAT RENDERS IFI'S LESS IMPORTANT; THE USG CAN CONTINUE DRAFTING, SUPPORTING AND VOTING FOR SEVERELY CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTIONS IN UN FORA, BUT AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE PLEBISCITE THE BACKLASH  
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ONLY STRENGTHENS PINOCHET'S HAND. IN SHORT, OUR RANGE OF POTENTIAL PUNITIVE ACTIONS HAS LARGELY BEEN DEPLETED. THEORETICALLY THE USG COULD DANLE REWARDS SUCH AS RENEWED ECONOMIC OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS BAIT TO ENCOURAGE THE GOC TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS GOALS. PRACTICALLY, THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE. THE U.S. POLITICAL REALITY IS THAT IMPORTANT GROUPS SUPPORTING THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE MADE OPPOSITION TO THE GOC THE LITMUS TEST OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIRTUE. REGARDLESS OF THE SITUATION IN CHILE. IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO "REWARD AND ENCOURAGE."

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B. THE INTERFERENCE OPTION.

1) THIS APPROACH IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AS LONG AS PINOCHET REMAINS IN POWER REAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS IMPOSSIBLE. THEREFORE, HE MUST GO AND THE U.S. SHOULD PROMOTE THE PROCESS. THE QUESTION STILL IS "HOW?" THE HONEST ANSWER IS BY INTERFERING BLATANTLY AND EXTENSIVELY IN CHILEAN AFFAIRS. ECONOMICALLY, THE USG COULD TRY TO "MAKE THE ECONOMY SCREAM" BY TERMINATING THE REMAINING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID PIPELINES, VOTING AGAINST EVERY IFI LOAN TO CHILE, REGARDLESS WHETHER IT IS DESTINED FOR THE NEEDY OR NOT, PRESSURING U.S. BANKS AND PRIVATE INVESTORS TO STAY OUT OF THE COUNTRY, OR EVEN ATTEMPTING A BOYCOTT. POLITICALLY WE COULD SUPPORT THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION GROUPS IN AND OUTSIDE CHILE IN A VARIETY OF WAYS RANGING FROM SYMBOLIC ACTS THROUGH ACTIVELY WORKING WITH THEM TO OUTRIGHT FINANCIAL SUBSIDY, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT IMPROVED U.S./CHILEAN RELATIONS DEPENDED ON PINOCHET'S OUSTER. WE COULD SUSTAIN OUR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GOC IN ALL INTERNATIONAL FORA.

2) I TOTALLY OPPOSE THIS APPROACH FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS. FIRST, THE U.S. IS PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY IT IS SO; IT MUST BE SO. THE INTERFERENCE OPTION WOULD FLATLY CONTRADICT A BASIC TENET OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WHICH HOLDS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT SEEK TO IMPOSE OUR PREFERRED PERSONS OR REGIMES ON OTHER SOCIETIES.

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TRYING TO DESTABILIZE PINOCHET WILL NOT ATONE FOR THE MISTAKE OF TRYING TO DESTABILIZE ALLENDE. MOREOVER, THE MULTIPLE STANDARD PROBLEM IN THE FORM OF A POLICY OF UNRELENTING HOSTILITY AND INTERFERENCE APPLIED UNIQUELY TO CHILE WILL NOT COMMAND PUBLIC SUPPORT. U.S. BUSINESS, PARTICULARLY, IS AWARE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE HERE IS CERTAINLY NOT WORSE THAN IN SCORES OF OTHER COMMUNIST AND THIRD WORLD DICTATORSHIPS. THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL/COMMERCIAL COMMUNITY WILL RESIST EFFORTS AIMED AT DISCOURAGING TRADE AND INVESTMENT SOLELY IN CHILE. FINALLY, THE INTERFERENCE OPTION HAS A LONG AND UNDISTINGUISHED HISTORY OF FAILURE HERE, AND WILL NOT WORK NOW. IN THE '60'S THE U.S. INTERFERED IN CHILEAN POLITICS THROUGH ALL-OUT SUPPORT OF THE

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS. IT DID NOT WORK: BOTH THE PARTY AND ITS POLICIES FINISHED A POOR THIRD IN 1970. IN THE EARLY '70'S WE INTERFERED BY TRYING TO PREVENT ALLENDE'S ELECTION. IT DID NOT WORK. THE TERMS AND TIMING OF THE ALLENDE OUSTER WERE ESTABLISHED BY THE CHILEAN MILITARY, NOT BY US. INTERFERENCE TODAY WOULD BE EQUALLY DISASTROUS. THERE IS THE REAL RISK OF STRENGTHENING PINOCHET. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS A DANGER THAT HIS DEPARTURE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES (I.E., AS A RESULT OF FOREIGN PRESSURE) WOULD RESULT IN FURTHER RADICALIZATION OF CHILEAN POLITICS DOWN THE ROAD. IN SHORT, FOR BOTH ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL REASONS I STRONGLY OPPOSE THE DESTABILIZATION OPTION.

C. THE DISDAIN OPTION.

THIS APPROACH IS BASED ON THE PROPOSITION THAT IN THE LONG RUN ONLY THE CHILEANS CAN OR SHOULD DETERMINE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CHILE. IN MY VIEW THE HIGH COST OF ISOLATION, FEAR OF ITS NEIGHBORS AND THE RESILIENCE OF THE SYSTEM OF DEMOCRATIC TRADITION WILL FORCE BASIC CHANGES IN THE PRESENT REGIME OVER THE LONGER RUN. SUCH A PROCESS OF CHANGE, NOT INVOLVING FOREIGN INTERVENTION, IS LIKELY TO BE LESS RADICAL AND MORE DEMOCRATIC THAN THE CHANGES, IF ANY, RESULTING FROM THE PREVIOUS OPTION. WITHIN AN OVERALL POSTURE OF COOL DISDAIN FOR THE GOC

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AND MAINTAINING FULLY ALL EXISTING SANCTION WE WOULD CONCENTRATE ON POLICY GOAL I (ELIMINATION OF GROSS VIOLATIONS). TO ASSURE THAT THOSE SEEKING PEACEFUL CHANGE ARE NOT INTIMIDATED BY THE REGIME, WE WOULD PRESS VIGOROUSLY FOR THE ELIMINATION OF REMAINING GROSS VIOLATIONS AND AGAINST ANY RECIDIVISM IN THIS AREA. SECONDARILY, WE WOULD URGE PROGRESS TOWARD OUR POLITICAL (II AND III) AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC (V) POLICY GOALS, BUT WITHOUT EMPLOYING EITHER THE REWARDS IMPLICIT IN OPTION A OR THE DESTABILIZING

INTERFERENCE OF OPTION B.

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3. RECOMMENDATION. I SUPPORT AND RECOMMEND OPTION C. OPTIONS A (WORKING THROUGH THE REGIME) AND B (DESTABILIZING THE REGIME) ARE NOT STRAWMEN. BOTH HAVE HONEST ADVOCATES IN THE DEPARTMENT AND ELSEWHERE. MY ARGUMENT IS THAT FOR DIFFERENT REASONS NEITHER IS WORKABLE. WHAT IS WORKABLE, IF LESS DRAMATICALLY AND OVER A LONGER TIME SPAN, IS AN APPROACH WHICH, BY MAINTAINING PRESSURE AGAINST THE PENALTIES FOR DISSENT, ENCOURAGES THE CHILEANS TO ELABORATE AND ACHIEVE THEIR OWN FORM OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

4. IMPLEMENTATION. IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT OPTION C, I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO HUMAN RIGHTS. ALL OTHER GOALS FOR U.S./CHILE RELATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE PLAYED OUT AGAINST THE CONSTRAINTS INHERENT IN THIS POLICY IMPERATIVE. IN PARTICULAR, OUR POLICY GOAL OF REDUCED REGIONAL TENSIONS MAY BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE PROBLEM HERE IS THAT THE STATE OF U.S./GOC RELATIONS MAY CONTRIBUTE TO AN ARGENTINE OR PERUVAIN DECISION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CHILE'S WEAKENED CONDITION BY ARMED BORDER INCURSIONS IN FRONTIER AREAS.

A. MAINTAIN PRESENT SANCIONS IN PLACE AND HOLD OUT NO HOPE THEY WILL BE LIFTED.

B. IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLD-WIDE APPLICATION OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, CONTINUE TO SPEAK PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHILE BUT WITH A FREQUENCY

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AND MANNER OF DIALOGUE THAT NEITHER ENCOURAGES THE GOC TO EXPECT RAPID IMPROVEMENT OF U.S./CHILE RELATIONS NOR ALLOWS IT TO RALLY SUPPORT AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. IN THIS:

-- PLACE PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON ELIMINATING REMAINING VIOLATIONS OF THE PERSON (GOAL I) IN THE CONTEXT OF ADEQUATE LEGAL SAFEGUARDS (GOAL II),

-- REACT STRONGLY TO PUNISHMENTS METED OUT TO PERSONS PEACEFULLY DISSENTING FROM THE REGIME'S CURRENT RESTRICTIONS, THEREBY ADVANCING INTERESTS IN RESTORING DEMOCRACY (GOAL III) AND PROMOTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUITY (GOAL V).

C. ADOPT A LESS ACTIVIST ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL FORA REGARDING CHILE ON THE BASIS THAT CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTIONS SOLELY AGAINST CHILE WEAKEN THE U.S. POSTURE WHILE STRENGTHENING PINOCHET'S HAND.

D. IN THE UN AND OAS CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ON-SITE VISITS BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS (UNHRC

AND IAHC).

E. WORK WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (PARTICULARLY ICEM) TO PROMOTE THE RELEASE OF THE REMAINING POLITICAL PRISONERS.

F. RETAIN A AIFLD PRESENCE IN SANTIAGO TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC LABOR LEADERS.

G. REINSTITUTE OPG'S TO AID U.S. CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS TO ASSIST NON-GOVERNMENTAL CHILEAN GROUPS IN ALLEVIATING THE CONDITION OF THE NEEDIEST.

H. WHILE RETAINING THE CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE DEVELOPED WITH THE DEMOCRATIC CENTER, SPREAD OUR CONTACTS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OF THIS CORE GROUP IN ORDER TO BLUNT THE MISPERCEPTION THAT WE SUPPORT EXCLUSIVELY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS.

I. CONTINUE TO USE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TO INVLUENCE CHILEAN PUBLIC OPINION MOLDERS OF THE LONG-RANGE BENEFITS OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY FOR BOTH CHILE AND THE WORLD.

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